LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Commit at assess impact

Supply Chain · Supplier Collaboration · line SC8B · Supply Alert. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 2 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
2
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
2
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
SC8B-1052
Subject
Talia Raman
Requested by
Daniel Nakamura
Value
$45k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
Collaborative Planning Agent (agent)
Sub-function owner
Director, Supplier Collaboration
Orchestrator
Supplier Collaboration Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Forecast Sharing AgentgbsCleared

Cleared detect supplier signal

2026-08-18 05:05:00ZAuthority SC8-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention OPS-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
materiality-bands@v9
Tools
ledger-write@t7, document-fetch@t9
in c70a1a55...433b10out def1c22a...3235acartifact ART-SC8B-1007-1 genesis 314c6887...15e606
2
Commit Confirmation AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at assess impact

2026-08-18 07:02:00ZAuthority SC8-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention OPS-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
materiality-bands@v9
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 279c923a...cde513out 9618a7ab...92e123artifact ART-SC8B-1007-2 314c6887...15e606 74cda650...0e0c8d

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

SC8-AUTH-A1ActiveSupplier Collaboration Orchestrator

Any unit on a supplier collaboration line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $2,000,000US · UK · DE · SGDelegated from Director, Supplier CollaborationExpires 2027-02-04

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policymateriality-bandsv9currentGroup controller
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetledger-writet7currentFinance systems
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Notify planner
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the commit decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Director, Supplier Collaboration · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

OPS-3Y3 years
Operational routing and execution
Internal operating requirement. No statutory driver, so the shortest defensible period is used deliberately.
Deleted at three years. This is the only class where the estate deletes rather than retains by default.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.