LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Forecast item at detect deviation

Supply Chain · Demand Planning · line SC1B · Demand Signal Response. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 1 record were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
1
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
1
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
SC1B-1002
Subject
Farrah Duarte
Requested by
Clara Muller
Value
$62k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
P2P spine (gbs)
Sub-function owner
Director, Demand Planning
Orchestrator
Demand Planning Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Demand Planning OrchestratororchestratorIn progress

Holding at detect deviation

2026-08-18 08:49:00ZAuthority SC1-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A3Retention OPS-3Y
Prompt
orchestrator-brief@p14
Policy
materiality-bands@v9
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12, notify-and-route@t5
in b533dfdb...723005out a625f213...6075fbartifact ART-SC1B-1000-1 genesis d5e4e3cb...c471d4

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

SC1-AUTH-A1ActiveDemand Planning Orchestrator

Any unit on a demand planning line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $2,000,000US · UK · DE · SG · AUDelegated from Director, Demand PlanningExpires 2027-06-05

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelreasoner-core5.4currentPlatform model council
policymateriality-bandsv9currentGroup controller
promptorchestrator-briefp14currentChief of Staff office
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetnotify-and-routet5currentPlatform engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Escalate outside band
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the forecast item decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Director, Demand Planning · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

OPS-3Y3 years
Operational routing and execution
Internal operating requirement. No statutory driver, so the shortest defensible period is used deliberately.
Deleted at three years. This is the only class where the estate deletes rather than retains by default.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.