LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Quote at close

Revenue Operations · Quote-to-Order · line RO3C · Quote Expiry Sweep. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 4 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
4
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
4
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
RO3C-1029
Subject
Leila Marchetti
Requested by
Yuki Tanaka
Value
$43k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
Approval Routing Agent (agent)
Sub-function owner
Director, Quote Operations
Orchestrator
Quote Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Configuration Validation AgentgbsCleared

Cleared detect stale

2026-08-18 08:42:00ZAuthority RO3-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A4Retention CUST-5Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
customer-commitments@v5
Tools
ledger-write@t7, document-fetch@t9
in 87724293...7da444out 3fdeb071...06d510artifact ART-RO3C-1004-1 genesis ac53aa2e...3ab1a9
2
Configuration Validation AgentgbsCleared

Cleared notify owner

2026-08-18 08:46:00ZAuthority RO3-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A4Retention CUST-5Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
customer-commitments@v5
Tools
ledger-write@t7, document-fetch@t9
in ee646e65...fd8b3aout 4f267a63...459095artifact ART-RO3C-1004-2 ac53aa2e...3ab1a9 f4043cfa...277714
3
Configuration Validation AgentgbsCleared

Cleared re-price

2026-08-18 08:51:00ZAuthority RO3-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A4Retention CUST-5Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
customer-commitments@v5
Tools
ledger-write@t7, document-fetch@t9
in 7c461b91...fa9d8fout 4ce1731a...e46b72artifact ART-RO3C-1004-3 f4043cfa...277714 1066c5de...0a4ac6
4
Document Generation AgentgbsIn progress

Holding at close

2026-08-18 08:55:00ZAuthority RO3-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A4Retention CUST-5Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
customer-commitments@v5
Tools
ledger-write@t7, document-fetch@t9
in 8346f625...e123c4out 1461d182...f0a3f3artifact ART-RO3C-1004-4 1066c5de...0a4ac6 e7c9c912...2e3199

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

RO3-AUTH-A1ActiveQuote Orchestrator

Any unit on a quote-to-order line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $2,000,000US · UK · DEDelegated from Director, Quote OperationsExpires 2026-10-24

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policycustomer-commitmentsv5currentChief revenue officer
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetledger-writet7currentFinance systems
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

This line runs without a formal gate.

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

CUST-5Y5 years
Customer commitment and service evidence
Consumer claim windows and revenue recognition audit trail.
Deleted at five years from the last account activity.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.