LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Model at engineer features

Research & Development · Data Science & Modeling · line RD5A · Model Development. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 2 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
2
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
2
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
RD5A-1009
Subject
Kofi Ellery
Requested by
Beatriz Farouk
Value
$41k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
DATA-ANALYTICS spine (gbs)
Sub-function owner
Director, Data Science
Orchestrator
Modeling Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Feature Engineering AgenttaskCleared

Cleared frame problem

2026-08-18 06:12:00ZAuthority RD5-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 48f2f6f9...bbd568out 1a71a954...afa162artifact ART-RD5A-1001-1 genesis cb55eae1...e37f48
2
Feature Engineering AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at engineer features

2026-08-18 07:36:00ZAuthority RD5-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in eb24925f...4c8458out 857499bc...6c02c3artifact ART-RD5A-1001-2 cb55eae1...e37f48 c76282ce...92a176

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

RD5-AUTH-A1ActiveModeling Orchestrator

Any unit on a data science & modeling line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $250,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Director, Data ScienceExpires 2026-12-03

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Reviewer approve
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the model decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Director, Data Science · not reached
Deploy
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the model decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Director, Data Science · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

TECH-3Y3 years
Technology change and access evidence
Security review and change audit requirement.
Deleted at three years from the change closing.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.