LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Privacy case at privacy review

Legal · Privacy & Data Protection · line LG9B · Privacy Impact Assessment. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 4 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
4
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
3
Taken by software
Human actions
1
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
LG9B-1010
Subject
Marcus Costa
Requested by
Jonas Delgado
Value
$76k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
Cross-border Transfer Agent (agent)
Sub-function owner
Data Protection Officer
Orchestrator
Privacy Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Data Subject Request AgenttaskCleared

Cleared trigger

2026-08-17 17:04:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction USAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 306ff8e2...b1a0d6out c5e04381...b9a244artifact ART-LG9B-1001-1 genesis c8c9940d...b5105e
2
Processing Register AgenttaskCleared

Cleared scope

2026-08-17 21:03:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction USAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 3184fbd3...485d1dout 3575ec41...6be010artifact ART-LG9B-1001-2 c8c9940d...b5105e cc4a146a...5eb29e
3
Impact Assessment AgenttaskCleared

Cleared draft assessment

2026-08-18 01:02:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction USAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 5c9ddb71...7721about 9c919721...ec1354artifact ART-LG9B-1001-3 cc4a146a...5eb29e 03745f57...131d7e
4
Data Protection Officergate-approverIn progress

Holding at privacy review

2026-08-18 05:01:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-H1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction USAutonomy A0Retention LEG-10Y
Model
human@n-a
Prompt
human@n-a
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
none
in 01f1f831...ad4fd7out 64e10a28...03c178artifact ART-LG9B-1001-4 03745f57...131d7e c9c84ca4...98a5e7

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

LG9-AUTH-A1ActivePrivacy Orchestrator

Any unit on a privacy & data protection line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $25,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Data Protection OfficerExpires 2026-11-09
LG9-AUTH-H1ActiveData Protection Officer

Anything the agent grant refuses, plus any override of an agent outcome. An override must state what the agent concluded and why it is being set aside.

Cap $250,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Legal leadershipExpires 2027-05-06

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Privacy review
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the privacy case decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Data Protection Officer · cleared on this chain
Sign
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the privacy case decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Data Protection Officer · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

LEG-10Y10 years
Legal and regulatory correspondence
Regulatory inspection windows and the outer limitation period for corporate filings.
Deleted at ten years. Never deleted while any related matter carries an open hold.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.