LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Privacy case at verify identity

Legal · Privacy & Data Protection · line LG9A · Data Subject Request. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 2 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
2
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
2
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
LG9A-1029
Subject
Yuki Voss
Requested by
Maeve Voss
Value
$48k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
LEGAL spine (gbs)
Sub-function owner
Data Protection Officer
Orchestrator
Privacy Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Privacy OrchestratororchestratorCleared

Cleared receive

2026-08-18 07:00:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction DEAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
orchestrator-brief@p14
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12, notify-and-route@t5
in cebf1296...2e3467out 0a6e6e31...72575aartifact ART-LG9A-1004-1 genesis 9e46f6f3...c97cfa
2
Data Subject Request AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at verify identity

2026-08-18 08:00:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction DEAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 757bfdbb...547500out b77a47c5...d37a7aartifact ART-LG9A-1004-2 9e46f6f3...c97cfa 4bfe257b...8a26fe

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

LG9-AUTH-A1ActivePrivacy Orchestrator

Any unit on a privacy & data protection line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $25,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Data Protection OfficerExpires 2026-11-09

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelreasoner-core5.4currentPlatform model council
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
promptorchestrator-briefp14currentChief of Staff office
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetnotify-and-routet5currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Privacy review
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the privacy case decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Data Protection Officer · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

LEG-10Y10 years
Legal and regulatory correspondence
Regulatory inspection windows and the outer limitation period for corporate filings.
Deleted at ten years. Never deleted while any related matter carries an open hold.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.