LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Privacy case at respond

Legal · Privacy & Data Protection · line LG9A · Data Subject Request. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 5 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
5
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
4
Taken by software
Human actions
1
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
LG9A-1020
Subject
Grace Achebe
Requested by
Anika Ito
Value
$6k
Materiality
low
Currently held by
LEGAL spine (gbs)
Sub-function owner
Data Protection Officer
Orchestrator
Privacy Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Data Subject Request AgenttaskCleared

Cleared verify identity

2026-08-18 08:50:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 53fd8509...b38e9fout 7e061fa6...7d43f8artifact ART-LG9A-1002-1 genesis e8a9f6b2...3eaf15
2
Processing Register AgenttaskCleared

Cleared locate data

2026-08-18 08:52:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 1ffb3937...836f42out 53e1302f...e253a5artifact ART-LG9A-1002-2 e8a9f6b2...3eaf15 841628ba...09914f
3
Impact Assessment AgenttaskCleared

Cleared assemble

2026-08-18 08:54:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 56e131f5...f5a11bout b5444406...8cbb3eartifact ART-LG9A-1002-3 841628ba...09914f 52516602...1a23b9
4
Data Protection Officeraccountable-ownerCleared

Cleared privacy review

2026-08-18 08:56:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-H1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A0Retention LEG-10Y
Model
human@n-a
Prompt
human@n-a
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
none
in 4b875427...ea4d2bout fd31051e...6a6739artifact ART-LG9A-1002-4 52516602...1a23b9 227f5d6f...ba99bc
5
Breach Triage AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at respond

2026-08-18 08:58:00ZAuthority LG9-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A2Retention LEG-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 28c5924b...8c6504out bc258dd9...8c2297artifact ART-LG9A-1002-5 227f5d6f...ba99bc e7dc111c...ba02e5

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

LG9-AUTH-A1ActivePrivacy Orchestrator

Any unit on a privacy & data protection line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $25,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Data Protection OfficerExpires 2026-11-09
LG9-AUTH-H1ActiveData Protection Officer

Anything the agent grant refuses, plus any override of an agent outcome. An override must state what the agent concluded and why it is being set aside.

Cap $250,000US · UK · DE · SG · AU · FRDelegated from Legal leadershipExpires 2027-05-06

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Privacy review
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the privacy case decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Data Protection Officer · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

LEG-10Y10 years
Legal and regulatory correspondence
Regulatory inspection windows and the outer limitation period for corporate filings.
Deleted at ten years. Never deleted while any related matter carries an open hold.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.