LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Network change at install

Information Technology · Network · line IT5C · Circuit Lifecycle. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 3 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
3
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
3
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
IT5C-1010
Subject
Zara Raman
Requested by
Leila Okafor
Value
$506
Materiality
low
Currently held by
Network Policy Agent (agent)
Sub-function owner
Director, Network Services
Orchestrator
Network Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Topology Monitoring AgentobserveCleared

Cleared detect need

2026-08-18 07:03:00ZAuthority IT5-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
observe-scan@p11
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12
in f3ee2d82...00f876out e2efa185...1242a9artifact ART-IT5C-1001-1 genesis b5f1dda1...01da8c
2
Topology Monitoring AgentobserveCleared

Cleared order

2026-08-18 07:42:00ZAuthority IT5-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
observe-scan@p11
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12
in 451ba38a...92f30aout d0daafcd...b938e0artifact ART-IT5C-1001-2 b5f1dda1...01da8c cd52fad2...035c4b
3
Configuration AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at install

2026-08-18 08:21:00ZAuthority IT5-AUTH-A1 · cap $25,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 24f35996...a3c868out 65c444ed...604464artifact ART-IT5C-1001-3 cd52fad2...035c4b 16d14fb3...cf2b82

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

IT5-AUTH-A1ActiveNetwork Orchestrator

Any unit on a network line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $250,000US · UK · DE · SG · AUDelegated from Director, Network ServicesExpires 2027-06-09

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
modelobserve-signal3.1currentSensing guild
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
promptobserve-scanp11currentSensing guild
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

This line runs without a formal gate.

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

TECH-3Y3 years
Technology change and access evidence
Security review and change audit requirement.
Deleted at three years from the change closing.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.