LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Change record at conflict check

Information Technology · Change & Release · line IT10A · Standard Change. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 3 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
3
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
3
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
IT10A-1020
Subject
Elena Nakamura
Requested by
Amara Marchetti
Value
$50k
Materiality
medium
Currently held by
IT spine (gbs)
Sub-function owner
Director, Change Management
Orchestrator
Change Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Change OrchestratororchestratorCleared

Cleared submit

2026-08-18 08:25:00ZAuthority IT10-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A3Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
orchestrator-brief@p14
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12, notify-and-route@t5
in 4c1a3cf4...368112out 28d11531...35edc1artifact ART-IT10A-1002-1 genesis 8e7434f5...6e8e87
2
Change Intake AgenttaskCleared

Cleared score risk

2026-08-18 08:37:00ZAuthority IT10-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A4Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in e5f3930d...424578out 6e8846eb...4ef0f4artifact ART-IT10A-1002-2 8e7434f5...6e8e87 124be390...7159ac
3
Risk Scoring AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at conflict check

2026-08-18 08:48:00ZAuthority IT10-AUTH-A1 · cap $250,000Jurisdiction UKAutonomy A4Retention TECH-3Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
segregation-of-duties@v4
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 96b9d52a...2af8b4out c8d1cef8...66a723artifact ART-IT10A-1002-3 124be390...7159ac d9f93819...0fc651

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

IT10-AUTH-A1ActiveChange Orchestrator

Any unit on a change & release line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $2,000,000US · UK · DE · SG · AUDelegated from Director, Change ManagementExpires 2027-04-04

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelreasoner-core5.4currentPlatform model council
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
policysegregation-of-dutiesv4currentInternal audit
promptorchestrator-briefp14currentChief of Staff office
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetnotify-and-routet5currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

This line runs without a formal gate.

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

TECH-3Y3 years
Technology change and access evidence
Security review and change audit requirement.
Deleted at three years from the change closing.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.