LensReading which lens this session carries.

Auditor evidence pack

Improvement at root cause

AI GBS & Global Business Services · Continuous Improvement · line GB10A · Signal to Improvement. This pack names every action taken on this unit, who or what took it, the authority that permitted it, and the model, prompt and policy versions in force at that moment.

Chain verified

Every record links to the one before it and hashes to its stored value. 2 records were re-hashed on this page load, in order, starting from the genesis value. Nothing was read from a cached verdict.

hash = sha256(prevHash + "|" + JSON{seq, unitRef, actor, action, outcome, occurredAt})

Records
2
Append-only, sequenced
Agent actions
2
Taken by software
Human actions
0
Taken by a named person
Refusals
0
Blocked by the authority register
Corrections
0
Later record supersedes an earlier one
Legal hold
None
Free to age out on schedule

The unit

What the work was, and where it sits

Reference
GB10A-1013
Subject
Leila Bianchi
Requested by
Idris Brennan
Value
$2.2m
Materiality
high
Currently held by
Benefit Measurement Agent (agent)
Sub-function owner
Head of Continuous Improvement
Orchestrator
Continuous Improvement Orchestrator

Every action, in order

Actor, authority, versions in force, and the hash link to the record before it

1
Waste Detection AgentobserveCleared

Cleared detect waste

2026-08-17 11:12:00ZAuthority GB10-AUTH-A1 · cap $2,000,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention AI-10Y
Prompt
observe-scan@p11
Policy
materiality-bands@v9
Tools
read-only-lookup@t12
in 3e484eb6...229759out d84f6c74...0e93e4artifact ART-GB10A-1001-1 genesis d1e95939...e93ace
2
Root Cause AgenttaskIn progress

Holding at root cause

2026-08-17 22:06:00ZAuthority GB10-AUTH-A1 · cap $2,000,000Jurisdiction SGAutonomy A3Retention AI-10Y
Prompt
task-execution@p21
Policy
materiality-bands@v9
Tools
document-fetch@t9, read-only-lookup@t12
in 7e9a2c0e...d631e1out 7e556b42...e75998artifact ART-GB10A-1001-2 d1e95939...e93ace e3e6c4ad...a3e237

Authority relied on

Who was allowed to do this, up to what value, in which jurisdictions

GB10-AUTH-A1ActiveContinuous Improvement Orchestrator

Any unit on a continuous improvement line where every intake check passed, the policy in force is current, and the value sits inside the cap below.

Cap $250,000US · UK · DE · SGDelegated from Head of Continuous ImprovementExpires 2026-11-23

Versions in force

Exactly what was running when these actions were taken

KindIdentifierVersionStatusOwner
modelextract-lite2.9currentPlatform model council
modelobserve-signal3.1currentSensing guild
policymateriality-bandsv9currentGroup controller
prompttask-executionp21currentShared service engineering
promptobserve-scanp11currentSensing guild
toolsetread-only-lookupt12currentPlatform engineering
toolsetdocument-fetcht9currentShared service engineering

Gates on this line

The control points this unit had to clear

Approve
Held for a named human when the unit exceeds the improvement decision envelope, when confidence falls below the floor, or when a policy clause is engaged.
Approver: Head of Continuous Improvement · not reached

Records schedule and holds

How long this evidence must be kept, and whether it is frozen

AI-10Y10 years
Autonomous decision evidence
Model risk and AI regulation expectations on traceability of automated decisions, taken at the longest emerging requirement rather than the current minimum.
Deleted at ten years. Never deleted where the decision affected a person and an appeal window may still open.

What this pack proves, and what it does not

Read this before you rely on it

It does prove
  • Every action carries a named actor, an actor kind, and a timestamp.
  • Every action names the authority grant that permitted it and the cap that grant carries.
  • Every action stamps the model, prompt, policy and tool versions in force at that moment.
  • Corrections are additive. A later record supersedes an earlier one and says why; the earlier record is never edited or deleted.
  • The chain is re-hashed live on this page, so a single altered field is detected immediately.
It does not prove
  • It is not tamper-proof against an attacker with write access to the store, who could rewrite the whole chain from genesis. Making that impossible requires publishing chain tips to a store this application cannot write to. That anchor is not built, and this page does not claim it.
  • The evidence in this demonstration is modeled from a simulated estate, not captured from production systems.
  • Identity here is the actor name recorded on the action. Cryptographic agent identity and signed attestation are a separate piece of work.